Union of India v. Alapan Bandyopadhyay (2022) 

This article is written by Shweta Singh. This article contains exhaustive details regarding the arguments of the parties, issues raised, and judgement delivered in this case by the Supreme Court. In addition to this, it also provides a critical analysis of the judgement, highlighting various aspects dealt with by the court.

This article has been published by Shashwat Kaushik.

The issue regarding the jurisdiction of the High Court with regard to matters concerning administrative actions of the government is often contested, and precisely for this reason, the case of Union of India v. Alapan Bandyopadhyay (2022) (hereinafter referred to as “this case”) grabbed a lot of attention. The Supreme Court, in this case, clarified which High Court shall have jurisdiction in cases where the administrative action is contested to have been undertaken within the jurisdiction of more than one High Court. The Supreme Court, in this case, attempted to resolve the issue of the jurisdiction of the High Court, which sometimes gets complicated in cases where several applicants together, file an original application under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act of 1985”) before a particular bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as “the tribunal”) and then challenge the transfer order, if passed under Section 25 of the Act of 1985, by the chairman of the tribunal before different High Courts based on their place of residence or cause of action.

Name of the case: Union of India v. Alapan Bandyopadhyay, (2022)

Name of the court: Hon’ble Supreme Court of India

Date of the judgement: January 6, 2022

Parties to the case

• Appellant: Union of India
• Respondent: Alapan Bandyopadhyay

Equivalent citations: 2022 LawSuit (SC) 14, (2022) 3 SCC 133

Type of the case: Civil Appeal No. 197 of 2022

Bench: Justice A. M. Khanwilkar and Justice C.T. Ravikumar

Statutes referred

1. The Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985: Section 19(1), Section 19, Section 5(4)(a), Section 5, and Section 25.
2. Central Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1987: Rule 6(2), Rule 6, Rule 4, Rule 4(5)(a), and Rule 4(5)(b).
3. The Constitution of India: Article 226.

The respondent in this case was an IAS officer serving as the Chief Secretary in West Bengal. His retirement was scheduled for May 31st, 2021. The state government sought an extension of his service by three additional months, which was approved by the central government through an official notification.

However, as a result of certain developments during the meeting held on May 28th, 2021, between the Prime Minister and the Chief Minister, whom the respondent also accompanied, the Central Government informed the State Government that the appointment of the respondent with the Central Government had been approved, and therefore, he was required to be released by May 31st, 2021, to join the office in New Delhi. Nevertheless, the State Government refused to release the respondent as directed by the Central Government and cancelled the notification issued earlier for extending the service period of the respondent beyond his scheduled date of retirement. Consequently, the respondent retired on May 31st, 2021.

On the date of his retirement, the respondent was issued a show cause notice by the Central Government under the National Disaster Management Act, 2005. After a few days, a major penalty was also levied on the respondent concerning the meeting held on 28th May 2021. The Petitioner reacted to these notices by raising objections about the validity and legitimacy of the Union’s actions against him. Following this, an inquiry authority was appointed, and a preliminary hearing was scheduled to take place in October 2021.

The appellant, then, later filed an original application before the Central Administrative Tribunal at Kolkata Bench. By filling out this original application, he challenged the disciplinary actions that were taken against him through the initiation of a charge sheet by the Central Government. The charges were due to his not showing up at a review meeting that was held on 28th May 2021, under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister of the country, which aimed at assessing the consequences of Cyclonic Storm ‘YAAS’. While this case was under consideration, the Union government (the appellant) filed a transfer petition under Section 25 of the Act of 1985 in which it prayed that the case might be transferred from the Kolkata Bench to the Tribunal’s Principal Bench in New Delhi.

The transfer petition was heard on 22nd October 2021, by the Tribunal’s Principal Bench in New Delhi. The respondent raised objections to the transfer petition and requested the bench permit him time to submit detailed objections, which were noted by the principal bench. However, permission was not granted by the principal bench to file objections. Instead, the bench allowed the transfer petition for two reasons. First, the bench noted that the case demanded urgent attention, and the Kolkata bench was on vacation. Second, the disciplinary proceedings against the respondent were conducted in Delhi, where the respondent was required to appear. Consequently, with the issuance of the order, the case was transferred to the principal bench and scheduled for admission on 27th October 2021.

The respondent assailed the said order passed in the transfer petition by filing the Writ petition before the High Court of Calcutta, which led to the passing of the impugned order that was challenged by the appellant in this case. The High Court of Calcutta, through its final order (impugned order), set aside the order passed by the Principal Bench of the Tribunal in New Delhi on the basis of two grounds. First, it believed the petition wasn’t just about the legality of the transfer order; it also touched on the respondent’s basic human rights of having his case heard in Kolkata, where he was living and working when the petition was filed. Secondly, the court held that the incident of the disciplinary proceedings took place in Kolkata. Therefore, most of the relevant events to the case happened in West Bengal, giving jurisdiction to the High Court.

As a result, the appellant, being aggrieved with the impugned order passed by the High Court, challenged it before the Supreme Court by way of a Special Leave Petition under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

The Supreme Court, while deciding the matter brought forth by the appellant challenging the impugned order passed by the Calcutta High Court, framed the following questions of law in appeal:

• Whether the remarks made by the High Court against the chairman of the tribunal were unnecessary, unjustified, and therefore liable to be expunged.
• Whether the High Court of Calcutta has the jurisdiction to review the order of transfer by the chairman of the principal bench seated in New Delhi.

Arguments presented by the appellant

The learned Solicitor General on behalf of the appellant submitted that a challenge against the order in the transfer petition passed by the principal bench of the tribunal in New Delhi could only be filed before the Delhi High Court since this tribunal falls under its jurisdiction. The appellant substantiated the contention by citing a judgement of a Constitutional Bench in the case of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997), wherein it was stated that the power of the High Court to review the orders and judgements passed by all the courts and tribunals that come within its jurisdiction is an essential part of the basic structure of the Constitution. It was also highlighted in this case that the decisions made by the tribunals are subject to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. According to the provisions outlined under these Articles, the decisions delivered by the tribunals had to be reviewed by a division bench of the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the respective tribunal falls. Furthermore, the appellant contended that Section 5(7) of the Act of 1985 provides that the benches of the tribunal generally sit in New Delhi, which is considered as the principal bench along with other specified places notified by the Central Government. The reference to such a Section was used to argue that the Calcutta High Court did not have any authority to review the order passed in the transfer petition.

The learned Solicitor General, in his arguments, referred to the precedent set by the Supreme Court in the case of JK Industries Ltd. & Anr. vs. Union of India & Ors. (2007). It was strongly argued that Rule 6 of the Central Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1987, had been misinterpreted by the High Court in a manner that undermined the Chairman’s authority to transfer a case, which is provided in Section 25 of the Act. The foundation of this argument lies in the legal interpretation principle, which provides that the rules made under the statute cannot be inconsistent with or override the provisions of the statute itself. Thus, it was argued that, as per this interpretation, provisions contained in Rule 6 could not be interpreted as limiting the power of the chairman to transfer cases under Section 25 of the Act of 1985, as the Act of 1985 itself grants such authority.

The appellant, in addition to the above arguments, raised concerns regarding certain statements made by the High Court towards the Chairman of the Tribunal, which were considered harsh and derogatory. Consequently, the learned Solicitor General argued that these comments were uncalled for and by citing many legal precedents, emphasised the need to remove or expunge the records completely. In other words, the Solicitor General viewed these remarks as being inappropriate and therefore unsuitable to be recorded as part of an official court record, a view that complies with legal principles and previous rulings that uphold fairness and decorum in court proceedings.

Arguments presented by the respondent

Several arguments were presented by the respondents in order to contest the maintainability of the writ petition filed before the Calcutta High Court. One of the main arguments presented by the respondent was that the High Court was justified in reviewing the order passed in the transfer petition because such an authority fell within its jurisdiction. It was also contended by the respondent that the sole reliance on Rule 6 of the Procedural Rules cannot take away the power granted under Section 25 of the Act of 1985 to the chairman of the tribunal.

After assessing the facts related to the case, the respondent put forth an argument that the High Court, while reviewing the order, was well within its authority and therefore had the jurisdiction to pass an order regarding the correctness of the transfer order passed by the chairman of the tribunal. This argument was primarily based on Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India, which grants the High Court jurisdiction over territories where the cause of action arises.

Article 226 of the Constitution of India

Every individual has been provided with some basic human rights under the Constitution of India, known as fundamental rights. The state is entrusted with the duty to protect the fundamental rights of an individual. Whenever such a fundamental right is violated by the state, every individual is granted the right to apply before the Supreme Court and the High Court under Articles 32 and 226 respectively to get those rights enforced in the form of issuance of writs, orders, or any such directions. Article 226 is provided under Part V of the Constitution of India, which authorises the High Court to issue writs. The main objective behind this Article is to provide a quick and effective remedy to the aggrieved person. The authority of the High Court under Article 226 cannot be curtailed by the legislature through the enactment of legislation. The scope of authority of the High Court under Article 226 is wider than the authority of the Supreme Court under Article 32 in cases relating to administration. While the administrative action is declared final by the legislation, it can still be challenged before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

The High Court, under Article 226, can issue several types of writs, depending on the nature of the case. A writ can be defined as a formal written order passed by the High Court having jurisdiction on the matter directing to do or not to do the performance of a specific act. The authority to issue a writ is a discretionary power of the High Court, which means that the court may refuse to issue writs on grounds like delay, availability of another remedy, or when the issuing of the writ serves no benefit to the parties. Article 226(1) provides that the High Court has the power to issue orders or writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, and certiorari against any individual or the government for the purpose of enforcing the fundamental right. As per this Article, such authority can also be exercised for enforcing other legal rights in addition to enforcing fundamental rights. Article 226(2) provides the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court for exercising such authority. As per Article 226(2), the High Court can issue writs to any person or government authority who is located within its jurisdiction. The High Court can also issue writs to any person or any public authority outside its territorial jurisdiction if the facts show that the circumstance forming part of the cause of action wholly or partially arises within its jurisdiction.

Section 25 of the Act of 1985

The provision of Section 25 of the Act of 1985 authorises the chairman of the tribunal to transfer the case from one bench to another. According to the provisions of Section 25, any party to the original application filed before any bench of the tribunal can make an independent application before the chairman of the tribunal to transfer the case pending before a bench where the original application has been filed to another bench. The chairman, after notifying the other party and hearing both sides, has the authority to pass an order for transferring the case from one bench to another. 

From the reading of this provision, it is clear that the chairman has the authority to transfer the cases from one bench to another, and such an order of transfer can also be made by the chairman in his suo moto capacity, having regard to the circumstances related to the case. Such circumstances may include the urgent disposal of the case and the availability of the parties. One of the fundamental principles enshrined in this Section is fairness and natural justice. The chairman under this Section cannot pass an order transferring the case from one bench to another without notifying the other party and affording it a fair chance of presenting its arguments against such a transfer.

The Supreme Court arrived at the conclusion that the Calcutta High Court did not have the jurisdiction to pass the impugned judgement and final order in the writ petition filed by the respondent. Consequently, the Supreme Court held the judgement to be invalid from the beginning and nullified it. Accordingly, the writ petition filed before the Calcutta High Court was rejected by the Apex Court. However, the Supreme Court clarified that the respondent had the freedom to challenge the impugned judgement before the High Court, having jurisdiction, if they were advised to do so.

The Supreme Court further clarified that it did not make any comment with regard to the correctness or legality of the decision passed in the transfer petition by the chairman of the principal bench of the tribunal in New Delhi. The court reiterated that the writ petition filed subsequently in relation to this matter would be considered independently, on its merits, and in full compliance with the law.

Issue-wise judgement of the case

Whether the remarks made by the High Court against the chairman of the tribunal were unnecessary, unjustified, and therefore liable to be expunged?

The Supreme Court, while considering the claims of the appellant regarding the harsh and derogatory statements against the chairman of the tribunal, recognised the findings of the High Court that the transfer petition was handled with undue urgency, thereby leading to the making of strict observations and remarks by the High Court towards the principal bench of the tribunal. However, the Apex Court further pointed out that, upon reviewing the documents on record, the impugned judgement in the writ petition filed before the Calcutta High Court was also passed at nearly the same pace. While deciding the matter, the Supreme Court referred to the case of Kashi Nath Roy v. State of Bihar (1996). In this case, it has been highlighted that the courts having appellate and revisional jurisdiction are established with the presupposition that the lower courts may commit an error in deciding a case, both on facts and also on law, and they are tasked with correcting a lower court on such errors. The Supreme Court highlighted that the judicial process is undertaken by humans and not by mechanics, and therefore committing errors is sometimes inevitable even if the utmost efforts have been made to adhere to precedent and exercise discretion judiciously.

The Supreme Court in this case further emphasised that whenever a High Court points out or detects any intolerable error in the order passed by the lower court, it becomes the duty of that High Court to resolve such error. However, the rectification of such an error should be done while maintaining the dignity of the court and the independence of the judiciary, and the court should never resort to the practice of delivering rebukes and harsh criticism while rectifying the errors. The Apex Court further noted that the High Court, in exercising its appellate and revisional functions, must convey its message in a persuasive, reasonable, and just manner targeted at rectifying the error and fulfilling the desired result. The bench, in this case, highlighted that criticising the subordinate judge for making a mistake should not be a general practice except if there are certain exceptional circumstances or situations that permit such condemnation by the higher court of the lower court.

The Supreme Court, after relying on the observations made in the aforementioned case and accessing the facts and circumstances surrounding this case, concluded that there was no existence of exceptional grounds to justify the harsh and derogatory remarks and observations made by the High Court against the principal bench of the tribunal. The Apex Court pointed out that the order in the transfer petition had, in fact, been passed by the chairman of the tribunal in response to the formal application filed by the applicant and after hearing both parties to the case. According to the law, as contained under Section 25 of the Act of 1985, the chairman also has the authority to pass a transfer order in its suo moto capacity. Therefore, all the remarks and observations directed at the chairman of the Tribunal were without any basis. The court, in the interest of maintaining the integrity of the judicial process, held that the statements made against the chairman of the tribunal by the Calcutta High Court were unreasonable, unjustified, and could have been avoided as they were based on unfounded assumptions. As a result, the court strongly held that these statements were unwarranted in considering the correctness of the transfer order, and for this reason, they are liable to be removed from the court’s record.

Whether the Calcutta High Court had the jurisdiction to review the order of transfer by the chairman of the principal bench seated in New Delhi?

The Supreme Court decided upon this issue by taking reference to the observation made in the case of L. Chandra Kumar. In this case, the court observed that a division bench of the High Court has the authority to review the decisions made by the tribunal, which are located within the jurisdiction of the respective High Court. By referring to this observation, the Supreme Court clarified that tribunals also include those that pass an order in the case of a transfer petition, and therefore, only that High Court within whose jurisdiction the tribunal that has passed a transfer order would be legally entitled to review such an order by way of a writ petition.

In view of the aforementioned observation and explanation, the Supreme Court concluded that where it was found out by the High Court that the impugned order had been passed by the principal bench in New Delhi, the Calcutta High Court lost its authority, and hence its interference with the transfer order passed by the principal bench was unnecessary.

The court, in its decision, further emphasised that the bench hearing the matter in this present case, being of lower strength, was bound by the decision of the Constitution bench in the case of L. Chandra Kumar case. It stated that the benches of lower strength in the Supreme Court and the High Court did not have the authority to decide upon the territorial jurisdiction under Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India when it had already been decided by the larger bench because doing so would require reviewing the law established by a Constitution bench. The court opinionated that adopting a different view would lead to indefinite and multiple filings of the cases relating to the issue of jurisdiction whenever a decision passed under Section 25 of the 1985 Act would be challenged.

The court further stated that different interpretations would lead to a complex situation wherein several parties aggrieved by a single order of the tribunal may challenge such a decision before different High Courts on the basis of their residence. Therefore, given the above-mentioned observations, the Supreme Court held that a different interpretation would result in great difficulties with regard to cases that involve several parties who are aggrieved by the transfer order passed by the principal bench in New Delhi. All these aggrieved parties would challenge the validity of the transfer order in different High Courts, thereby giving rise to multiple cases being filed for the same order.

The judgement in this case has been passed by the Supreme Court, relying extensively on the L. Chandra Kumar case. However, the observation upon which the court has made its decision regarding the issue at hand cannot be considered a ratio decidendi in the present case. In addition to this, the facts and the question of law that were present for the consideration of the court in the L. Chandra Kumar case were also completely different from the present case. In the case of L. Chandra Kumar, the issue before the Supreme Court was to determine the effect of Articles 323-A(2)(d) and 323-B(3)(d) of the Constitution of India on the powers of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. It is important to note that in the case of Union of India v. Dhanwati Devi (1996), it has been observed that in order to assess the binding authority of a particular judgement, it becomes essential to understand what were the facts upon which the decision was given and what was the question of law that required to be decided. It was emphasised that a judgement can never be interpreted as a statute, and therefore every word or sentence within the judgement cannot be considered a complete explanation of the law. The law cannot be considered static, and therefore, while applying precedent to the current issue at hand, the judges must always employ a thoughtful approach by ascertaining the facts and questions of the law on which the decision was made. It is therefore important to note that, given the above observation, the interpretation of Article 226 of the Constitution of India was not the main issue of consideration for the court in the L. Chandra Kumar case, and for this reason, any interpretation with regard to Article 226(2) can only be considered as obiter dicta. In short, the Supreme Court in the present case had committed a mistake in applying the observation made by the court in the L. Chandra Kumar case and therefore, through its decision, limited the extent of Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

The present case plays a significant role in highlighting the review jurisdiction of the High Court. All the decisions made by the lower courts and tribunals are subject to the review jurisdiction of the High Court under which the respective court or tribunal falls. The judgement in this case might have erred in placing its reliance on the judgement, which was completely different with regard to facts and the question of law from the present case; however, it aptly upheld the authority granted to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 

What was the main issue in this case?

The main issue before the Supreme Court in this case was with regard to the jurisdiction of the High Court of Kolkata in reviewing the transfer order passed by the chairman of the principal bench of the tribunal in New Delhi.

What is the scope of Article 226 of the Indian Constitution?

Under Article 226, the High Court is empowered to issue orders or writs for the enforcement of the fundamental rights and other legal rights of an individual. Such power to issue writs is discretionary in nature and can be refused on the grounds of the existence of an alternative and effective remedy.